United States v. Powell by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-12-1997 
United States v. Powell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Powell" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 102. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/102 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 12, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 96-7242 and 96-7274 
 





Appellant at No. 96-7242 
 
ANTONIO POWELL, 
Appellant at No. 96-7274 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 95-cr-00055-1 and 95-cr-00055-2) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 10, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, SCIRICA and ALITO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed May 12, 1997) 
 
JOSEPH A. O'BRIEN, ESQUIRE 
Oliver, Price & Rhodes 
220 Penn Avenue, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1409 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501-1409 
 
 Attorney for Appellant, 
 James Powell 
 
 
CLYDE K. MIDDLETON, ESQUIRE 




 Attorney for Appellant, 
 Antonio Powell 
 
WILLIAM S. HOUSER, ESQUIRE 
Office of United States Attorney 
309 Federal Building 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501 
 
 Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Antonio and James Powell were indicted on federal 
charges for distributing cocaine and conspiracy. Antonio 
Powell pleaded guilty and now appeals his sentence. His 
brother James Powell was convicted by a jury and appeals 




In March and April of 1994, detectives of the Kingston, 
Pennsylvania, Police Department investigated the drug 
trafficking of James and Antonio Powell. During the course 
of the investigation, the detectives made six controlled 
purchases of cocaine base from Antonio Powell. On each 
drug delivery, James Powell accompanied his brother and 
occasionally acted as look-out. The brothers also made 
incriminating statements in a series of tape-recorded 
telephone conversations. 
 
A federal grand jury indicted Antonio and James Powell 
on conspiracy and drug distribution charges. Antonio 
Powell pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,1 two counts of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to 
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the 
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aiding and abetting distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), three counts of aiding and abetting 
distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), and one count of distributing cocaine base in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).2  James Powell pleaded not 
guilty and elected to represent himself at trial.3 A jury 
convicted James Powell on each count to which his brother 
pled guilty. James Powell was sentenced to one hundred 
and fifty months imprisonment. Antonio Powell was 
sentenced to eighty-seven months imprisonment. 
 
James Powell appeals the sufficiency of evidence 
supporting his conviction.4 Antonio Powell appeals his 
sentence, specifically an increase in his offense level for 




same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of 
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 
 
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) provides, in part: "Except as authorized by this 
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally -- (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance." 
 
3. The district court conducted an extensive colloquy with the defendant 
regarding the seriousness of the charged offenses, range of allowable 
punishment, and the perils of self-representation. The court held another 
discussion with Powell in chambers regarding these matters and sent 
Powell a letter summarizing the court's views on the perils of self- 
representation. The court then appointed counsel to be present at trial 
and to assist Powell. 
 
4. James Powell's counseled brief to this court raises only the issue of 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. In a "pro se 
supplemental brief" filed by James Powell apparently without the 
assistance of counsel, Powell also alleges the district court erred by (1) 
conducting an inadequate colloquy regarding his decision to represent 
himself at trial; (2) enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for 
perjury; and (3) ruling at sentencing that the substance involved in the 
drug transactions was crack cocaine. We have reviewed these 
contentions and find them to be without merit. 
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II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If a 
defendant fails to file a timely motion for judgment of 
acquittal, we review sufficiency of evidence for plain error. 
United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997). 
We review adjustments under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 under a 
two-part standard. We review a district court's factual 
determination of willful obstruction of justice for clear error, 
and its legal interpretation and application of the 
sentencing guidelines under a plenary standard. United 
States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992); 







James Powell was convicted of distributing cocaine base, 
conspiring to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and 
aiding and abetting distribution of cocaine and cocaine 
base. He now appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting 
and conspiracy for insufficiency of evidence. To convict for 
aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the 
defendant associated himself with the venture, that he 
participated in it as something that he wished to bring 
about, and that he sought by his action to make it succeed. 
United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 821 (3d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Bey, 736 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1984). To 
convict for conspiracy, the government must prove unity of 
purpose, the intent to achieve a common goal, and an 
agreement to work together toward that goal. All of these 
elements, including the existence of the agreement, may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v. 
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 253 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 613 (1996). 
 
Substantial evidence supported his conviction on the 
aiding and abetting counts. James Powell accompanied his 
brother each time Antonio Powell sold cocaine or cocaine 
base to undercover police officers. James Powell either 
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drove or rode in the vehicle transporting the cocaine. On 
three occasions, James Powell was a look-out during the 
drug transaction. On one occasion, Antonio Powell 
consulted him before setting a price for cocaine. On 
another, James Powell assured a police informant that the 
cocaine the Powell brothers would sell the next day would 
match in quality the cocaine sold earlier by Antonio Powell. 
Thus, there was strong evidence that when James Powell 
acted as a lookout and driver, he knew he was assisting in 
the sale of cocaine and cocaine base. Under the facts here, 
there was more than sufficient evidence to convict for 
aiding and abetting.5 
 
James Powell also challenges the sufficiency of evidence 
on his conspiracy conviction. He admitted at trial that he 
distributed cocaine on virtually a daily basis during March 
and April 1994. A witness testified that James and Antonio 
Powell lived together, that both sold cocaine, that they 
shared plastic bags to package the cocaine, and that if one 
of the brothers ran out of cocaine to sell, the other brother 
would supply it. As noted, James Powell assured a police 
informant that the cocaine the Powell brothers would sell 
the next day would match in quality the cocaine sold earlier 
by Antonio Powell. During a recorded telephone 
conversation, Antonio Powell consulted James Powell before 
setting the sales price for cocaine. These facts, together 
with James Powell's actions as lookout and driver, provided 
more than sufficient evidence to convict James Powell for 
conspiring with Antonio Powell to distribute cocaine.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. James Powell failed to ask for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion 
of the government's case-in-chief or at the end of the trial. Therefore, we 
review for plain error. Even if the plain error standard did not apply, 
there was sufficient evidence to convict. 
 
6. James Powell failed to ask for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion 
of the government's case-in-chief or at the end of the trial. Therefore, we 
review for plain error. Even if the plain error standard did not apply, 
there was sufficient evidence to convict. Powell does not raise on appeal 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for distribution, and 
therefore we will not review it. 
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B. 
 
Antonio Powell testified at his brother's trial that James 
Powell was not involved in the drug distribution conspiracy. 
This testimony was contradicted by extensive government 
evidence that James Powell accompanied Antonio Powell on 
each of the charged drug deliveries, acted as look-out, and 
made statements demonstrating his involvement in the 
pricing and sale of the cocaine delivered by Antonio Powell. 
Evidently Antonio Powell's testimony was rejected because 
the jury found James Powell guilty on all counts. 
 
After James Powell's trial, the probation departmentfiled 
an addendum to Antonio Powell's Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report recommending increasing his offense 
level for obstruction of justice because he testified falsely at 
his brother's trial. At the sentencing hearing, the district 
court found that Antonio Powell had obstructed justice and 
increased his offense level by two levels under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides: "If the defendant 
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or 
impede, the administration of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels." "[O]ffering 
perjured testimony is an attempt to obstruct justice." 
United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Application Note 3(b)), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1032 (1996). 
 
Antonio Powell does not contest the district court's 
factual determination that he committed perjury at his 
brother's trial when he testified James did not conspire 
with him to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. 
Nonetheless, the district court's finding that Antonio Powell 
offered perjured testimony at his brother's trial was not 
clearly erroneous. As noted, there was substantial evidence 
that James Powell conspired with his brother to distribute 
cocaine and cocaine base. The jury rejected Antonio 
Powell's testimony when it found James Powell guilty on all 
counts. Moreover, the district judge who sentenced Antonio 
Powell presided at his brother's trial. Therefore, the judge 
was well-positioned to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
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Instead, Antonio Powell contends that whether or not his 
testimony constituted perjury, it was not perjury in "the 
instant offense," so that it could not constitute obstruction 
of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 
 
We have held U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 applies only when a 
defendant has made efforts to obstruct the investigation, 
prosecution, or sentencing of "the offense of conviction." 
United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 958 (3d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Woods, 24 F.3d 514, 516 (3d Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 967-68 (3d Cir. 
1992). Thus, § 3C1.1 does not apply if a defendant makes 
false statements about other crimes or events, so long as 
those statements do not impede the investigation, 
prosecution, or sentencing of the crime for which he was 
convicted and for which he is being sentenced. In Woods, 
for example, we held § 3C1.1 does not apply where a 
defendant is convicted on armed robbery charges and 
subsequently makes false statements to government 
investigators about his friends' participation in a robbery 
for which the defendant was not indicted or convicted. 
Woods, 23 F.3d at 515-17. Similarly, in Belletiere, we held 
§ 3C1.1 is not applicable where a defendant is convicted on 
drug distribution and tax evasion charges but makes false 
statements to a probation officer about personal drug use 
which "had nothing to do with" the offenses for which he 
was convicted and were neither material to or impeded the 
government's investigation. Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 968. 
 
Section 3C1.1 will apply if the false statements impeded 
the investigation or prosecution of the charges for which 
the defendant is convicted. In Kim, for example, we held 
that § 3C1.1 applies where a defendant made false 
statements which obstructed the government's investigation 
of the drug possession charges for which defendant was 
later convicted. The fact that the false statements were also 
arguably related to a conspiracy count for which defendant 
was acquitted was not dispositive. Kim, 27 F.3d at 958-59. 
 
We have not decided whether U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 applies 
where a defendant pleads guilty and then attempts to 
impede the prosecution of a co-defendant for the same 
offenses. Other courts have decided this issue, but not 
uniformly. Compare United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 
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1446 (9th Cir. 1993) (§ 3C1.1 applies where defendant 
pleaded guilty and then testified falsely in codefendant/ 
coconspirator's trial) and United States v. Bernaugh, 969 
F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1992) (§ 3C1.1 applies where 
defendant pleaded guilty to offense but lied about the 
extent of codefendants' participation), with United States v. 
Partee, 31 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1994) (§ 3C1.1 does not apply 
where defendant pleads guilty but refuses to testify under 
grant of immunity at codefendant/coconspirator's trial) and 
United States v. Banks, 751 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Pa. 1990) 
(§ 3C1.1 does not apply where defendant convicted at trial 
testifies falsely at separate trial of co-defendant), aff'd on 
other grounds, 931 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1991) (Table). 
 
In United States v. Bernaugh, a defendant provided 
materially false information at his guilty plea hearing about 
the criminal conduct of his codefendants. At his sentencing 
hearing, the district court increased his offense level under 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that though § 3C1.1 applies 
only where the defendant obstructs or attempts to obstruct 
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the "instant 
offense," the sentencing guidelines "contemplate that an 
`offense' may include the concerted criminal activity of 
multiple defendants." Bernaugh, 969 F.2d at 861 (citing 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, Intro. comment). For that reason, the 
court held "the section 3C1.1 enhancement applies where a 
defendant attempts to obstruct justice in a case closely 
related to his own, such as that of a codefendant." Id. 
Bernaugh was cited with approval and followed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir. 1993) (§ 3C1.1 applies 
where defendant pleaded guilty and then testified falsely in 
co-defendant/co-conspirator's trial). 
 
Here, Antonio and James Powell were indicted as 
coconspirators for the same offenses in the same counts of 
the same indictment. As the Tenth Circuit noted in 
Bernaugh, the sentencing guidelines contemplate that an 
offense may be committed by more than one defendant. See 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, Intro. comment ("When an offense is 
committed by more than one participant . . . ."). When 
Antonio Powell testified that his brother had not conspired 
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with him to distribute cocaine, he was attempting to 
impede the prosecution of the same offenses for which he 
was convicted. 
 
This case may be distinguished from United States v. 
Partee, 31 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1994). In Partee, the 
defendant pleaded guilty but refused to testify under grant 
of immunity at a codefendant/coconspirator's trial. The 
district court enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, and the defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit 
observed that it had held in a previous case that § 3C1.1 
obstruction enhancement applied only where the defendant 
acted with specific intent to avoid responsibility for the 
offense for which he was being tried. Id. at 531 (citing 
United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 1993)). The 
court noted the defendant's refusal to testify at his 
codefendant's trial had no effect on his guilty plea and did 
not represent an attempt to avoid responsibility for the 
offense for which he was convicted. For these reasons, 
enhancement under § 3C1.1 was inappropriate. Id. 
 
The Partee decision appears to have turned on the 
Seventh's Circuit's prior decision in Haddad that the 
§ 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement can be applied only 
where the defendant acted with specific intent to avoid 
responsibility for the offense for which he was tried. We 
have not adopted a similar rule in this circuit. Moreover, 
the court of appeals specifically noted that the district court 
in Partee had an alternative to sentence enhancement -- it 
could punish the defendant's refusal to testify under grant 
of immunity by holding him in criminal contempt. There 
was no such possibility here. 
 
For these reasons, the district court did not err when it 
applied § 3C1.1 after it determined that Antonio Powell had 





At Antonio Powell's sentencing hearing, the district court 
found the substance involved in Count VII was crack 
cocaine. Antonio Powell claims the laboratory report 
involved in count VII states that the substance was 
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"cocaine base" and a "powder." Powell observes that cocaine 
base is a crystalline substance, not a powder, and that the 
report may be inaccurate. Powell argues the district court 
erred when it relied on the report to calculate his base level 
without ordering retesting of the substance. 
 
At his guilty plea colloquy, the district court specifically 
advised Powell that he was charged in count VII with 
distributing crack cocaine. The government represented 
and Antonio Powell repeatedly admitted the substance in 
question was crack cocaine. When asked by the court if he 
disagreed with the factual basis for the plea as described by 
the government, Powell did not deny that the substance in 
count VII was crack cocaine. The court then advised Powell 
that if the case proceeded to trial, the government would 
have to prove that the substance in count VII was crack 
cocaine. Antonio Powell once again stated that he 
understood the factual basis of the plea. "There can be no 
question that admissions to the court by a defendant 
during a guilty plea colloquy can be relied upon by the 
court at the sentencing stage." United States v. James, 78 
F.3d 851, 856 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 128 (1996). 
Here, Antonio Powell's admissions provided sufficient basis 
for the court to conclude that the substance in count VII 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of conviction 
and sentences will be affirmed. 
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